Argentine diplomat Figueroa proposes sustainable ocean plan to coordinate management of the Argentine Sea

Argentine diplomat Figueroa published an opinion column titled "The Argentine Sea, hardware without software" in Revista Supernova on October 28, 2026, proposing that Argentina advance a Sustainable Ocean Plan (POS). He defines the plan as "a strategic tool for translating international commitments into concrete national public policies," and advocates joint planning of marine and coastal space so that ecosystem protection, production development, food security and ocean governance are no longer managed as separate, disconnected sectors.

Figueroa is a graduate of the University of Buenos Aires School of Law and of the National Foreign Service Institute. He served as Argentina's ambassador to the United Kingdom from 2020 to 2024 and to Cuba from 2018 to 2020, and was previously Undersecretary for the Malvinas and South Atlantic. His connection to the fisheries agenda has precedent: from 2005 to 2010 he represented the Foreign Ministry on the Federal Fisheries Council and served as Argentina's commissioner to the International Whaling Commission, and later represented the ministry in the Pampa Azul initiative. He currently works in the Secretariat for the Malvinas, Antarctica, Ocean Policy and South Atlantic, where he is responsible for the South Atlantic Ocean Policy Coordination Office (CPOAS).

Figueroa's starting point is a paradox. As he details, Argentina's marine space—territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf—covers 6,683,000 square kilometers and 11,000 kilometers of continental, island and Antarctic coastline, equivalent to more than two-thirds of the country's land area. Yet he argues that this scale has never been translated into a political narrative capable of supporting integrated public policies and a corresponding budget.

The author looks to economic history for an explanation. He argues that the 19th-century agricultural export model and the subsequent industrialization never required the institutional, legal and cultural architecture of a maritime nation, and that the main ports operated more as cargo terminals than as shipbuilding and innovation hubs. This logic helps explain why the loss of a shipbuilding industry that once led the region did not provoke a greater reaction, and why ocean-related projects have often been interrupted.

Figueroa argues, however, that this relationship is not predetermined. Citing Carl Schmitt's Land and Sea, he recalls that Britain's transformation from an agricultural and livestock country into a naval power was the result of political decisions, with legislation reserving trade for national vessels and giving rise to a shipbuilding industry. He adds that the United States later followed a similar path.

Fisheries occupy a central place in Figueroa's list of opportunities. He emphasizes that the sector generates more than US$2 billion in exports, and that value-added processing of catches could multiply that figure.

He also points to the opportunity for Patagonian ports—currently underused—in the activity of third-country-flag vessels operating outside the exclusive economic zone: they could compete for the logistics rents currently retained by Montevideo and other terminals in the region.

The list also includes: port infrastructure and a support fleet required for Vaca Muerta hydrocarbon exports; potential offshore development on the continental shelf comparable to Brazil's Pre-Sal; hydrogen projects in Patagonia; seabed mining; and Antarctic logistics based in Ushuaia—which already concentrates 90% of tourist vessel traffic to Antarctica. He argues that all these activities will require naval engineers, geologists, marine biologists, shipyards and ports.

According to Figueroa, the country already possesses the most valuable resource for building the software its ocean policy lacks: knowledge. He cites CONICET institutes such as CENPAT and CADIC, universities such as the National University of Defense, the National Institute for Fisheries Research and Development (INIDEP) and the Naval Hydrographic Service, as well as the technical teams of the Navy, the Naval Prefecture and the Foreign Ministry and a broad network of civil society organizations. He places these within what theorist Peter Haas calls an "epistemic community": a network of experts who share a diagnosis and aspire to translate it into public policy.

He sees the problem as fragmentation. Although interministerial spaces such as the Pampa Azul initiative exist, they address only part of the agenda. Figueroa reviews national councils and other institutional arrangements by which other countries have resolved coordination problems, but questions whether such solutions are feasible under Argentina's current circumstances. He therefore suggests focusing on processes rather than new structures, and positions the POS as a method for organizing the uses of marine space, attracting international financing, strengthening the blue economy and coordinating environmental and climate commitments.

For the plan to work, the author sets out a series of conditions. It must include all actors—national, provincial and municipal governments, the private sector, the scientific community and civil society—coordinate different state agencies, rely on the best available science and ecosystem approaches, adapt to changing scenarios, take territorial and cultural specificities into account, enjoy consensus at the highest political level to guarantee implementation and financing, and be planned over a multi-year horizon.

As precedents, he cites experiences in the region. Mexico presented its Sustainable Ocean Plan in December 2025 after a two-year process that spanned a change of government and succeeded in uniting sectors with opposing interests. Costa Rica has made progress in marine protection, payment for ecosystem services, mangrove management and marine spatial planning, linked to its climate agenda, while Colombia has reaffirmed its commitment to an ocean agenda. Figueroa concludes from these cases that there is no single institutional model, but that political leadership, state coordination and continuity are indispensable. In Argentina's case, he adds, many of the necessary capabilities already exist in areas such as defense, fisheries, environment, energy, transport, science, the port system and marine research.

Figueroa places the proposal within geopolitical change. He describes how, after decades of strategic irrelevance following the opening of the Panama Canal, the South Atlantic has regained importance within the framework of US-China competition. Control of sea routes, access to Antarctica and the hydrocarbon resources of the Malvinas Islands—and the tensions that would be involved in the dispute with the United Kingdom—lead him to interpret that political and economic leadership will pay more attention, regardless of the government in office. He also warns of a possible erosion of the Antarctic Treaty system, and notes that without a presence on the Antarctic continent and logistical capacity, the country cannot exert influence in that discussion.