海产智讯

Norwegian Lawyer Questions Salmon Farming "Traffic Light System": Procedural Flaws in 6% Production Cut Decision and Expert Mechanism

Norwegian lawyer Halfdan Mellbye, in an article dated 16 November 2026, questioned the procedure behind the Ministry of Fisheries' decision to impose a 6% production cut on PO3 under the "traffic light system," arguing that the expert group's assessment methodology is flawed and that the Ministry did not handle industry objections through an adversarial process.

Halfdan Mellbye, a lawyer at the Norwegian law firm SANDS, published an article on 16 November 2026 questioning the way Norway's "traffic light system" (trafikklyssystem) is managed. He has served since 2017 as one of the advisers to the PO3 and PO4 farming industry on matters related to the traffic light system, and the article states explicitly that the views expressed are his own.

The article comes as the Norwegian Parliament (Storting) is about to consider a proposal from the Conservative Party (Høyre) not to implement the already-adopted production cut for PO3 in 2027. Mellbye notes that, if passed, the proposal would mean amending the latest capacity adjustment regulation issued on 20 August this year, which provides that from 20 February 2027 the production framework for PO3 will be cut by 6%.

Mellbye considers the Conservative Party's proposal to be a correct follow-up to the traffic light system adopted by Parliament in 2015 and the subsequent production area regulations. He explains that the substantive logic of the traffic light system is as follows: a production cut is justified because it reduces the production of salmon lice at PO3 farming facilities, so that fewer wild salmon smolts migrating out of rivers in that production area are exposed to salmon lice, lowering the mortality of out-migrating wild salmon and allowing more wild salmon to survive until they return to the rivers to spawn, thereby strengthening wild salmon populations.

At the same time, however, he points out that whether a production cut will actually produce this effect is "highly uncertain." In his view, the weakness in the system established by the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries (Nærings- og Fiskeridepartementet) to manage the traffic light system and the production area regulations lies precisely in its insufficient handling of this substantial uncertainty.

Mellbye emphasizes the formal legal structure of the traffic light system: the production area regulations confer decision-making authority within the system on the Ministry of Fisheries. The Ministry then chose to establish an expert group and a steering group to provide professional support to the Ministry. These two groups derive their mandate from the Ministry, but they are not mentioned in the regulations, nor were they mentioned during parliamentary consideration in 2015.

In exercising its powers under the traffic light system, the Ministry chose to leave the handling of uncertainty to the experts. Mellbye argues that this has meant that, when the Ministry makes the final decisions on production cuts and growth, the real uncertainty is not taken seriously. He describes the weaknesses of the expert group as operating at two levels.

First, the experts do not clearly describe the uncertainty relevant to the Ministry's decisions on production cuts and growth. The experts assess the uncertainty of individual professional sub-questions within the methodology on which the expert group's report is based, and overall uncertainty is derived by aggregating the answers to the sub-questions. But the expert group's report does not describe the overall uncertainty involved in the Ministry's final decisions on production cuts and growth. In other words, the experts do not clearly state the uncertainty surrounding the question of whether the recently adopted PO3 production cut will have a positive effect on wild salmon populations in the rivers of the region. Mellbye argues that the Ministry cannot obtain a description of important aspects of the relevant uncertainty from the expert group's annual reports, and must therefore handle it properly itself.

Second, the methods the expert group uses to assess uncertainty are themselves weak. These methods were evaluated by psychologist Jan-Ole Hesselberg on commission from PO ¾ Kunnskapsinkubator, and the results were published in a report entitled "Bias in the Traffic Light System's Expert Assessments" (Bias i Trafikklyssystemets ekspertvurderinger). According to the report, the expert group's conclusions are formed in four stages: each of seven methods produces a number, 9 to 10 experts make individual anonymous assessments, the group discusses to reach a consensus distribution, and finally the conclusion is set as a category.

Mellbye points out that, under the production area regulations, the traffic light system is not based on this kind of decision-making model. The regulations provide that setting the traffic lights and deciding on production cuts and growth are matters for the Ministry of Fisheries. If decisions were meant to be left to experts, the regulations would look different. Hesselberg's report identifies important weaknesses in the methods the expert group uses to ensure the quality of its assessments of uncertain questions. The report does not allege that the experts are dishonest, but rather holds that the methods they use have substantive flaws that may affect the quality of the conclusions.

Mellbye states that the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries' practice under the traffic light system shows that, in all production cut decisions and the vast majority of growth decisions, the expert group's conclusions have been given decisive weight. He considers this highly inappropriate for three reasons: the expert group does not assess all the relevant questions involving uncertainty; the expert group's methods are weak; and, as a matter of law, the expert group's assessments should not be decisive.

At the procedural level, Mellbye points out that the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries did not itself assess the core questions involving uncertainty before making growth and production cut decisions under the traffic light system, which is a major weakness in the Ministry's case handling. Citing principles of administrative law, he says that professional questions, including questions of uncertainty, should be handled in an open, adversarial process, meaning that the Ministry should receive all views and ensure that they are commented on and clarified as fully as possible. Only through open dialogue on professional questions and uncertainty can the best understanding of the issues be obtained and the best basis for a correct decision be established.

Mellbye argues that case handling under the traffic light system is far removed from the ideal of an adversarial process. Views from within the farming industry that question or criticize the professional basis on which the Ministry relies rarely become the subject of dialogue. The Ministry largely leaves such views to the experts, and in most cases the response is to reject the criticism without dialogue. He considers this approach particularly inappropriate because the parties have never attempted to clarify the core uncertainty, namely what effect a production cut will have on the development of wild salmon populations. He points out that it is important not only to reach a conclusion but also to elucidate and describe uncertainty through an adversarial approach, and that a major flaw in the case handling is precisely that this has not been given weight.

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