Over 500 Foreign Fishing Vessels Operating Outside Argentina's EEZ, Subsidy Dependence and New WTO Rules in Focus

In December 2025, the Argentine Naval Prefecture (Prefectura Naval) reported that it was preparing to monitor more than 500 foreign fishing vessels in the "201-mile" area during the coming fishing season. An article published in Argentina's Revista Puerto on October 13, 2026, notes that this figure demonstrates the scale of the phenomenon but does not answer the economic question underpinning it: can a fleet of this size cover the costs of fuel, wages, maintenance, insurance, credit, transshipment and logistics from the value of its catch alone? Or is part of it explained by flag-state governments bearing costs that companies should bear themselves?

According to the article, every fishing season a "city of lights" appears outside the boundary of Argentina's exclusive economic zone. These are squid jiggers, trawlers, refrigerated cargo vessels, tankers and other auxiliary vessels that sail thousands of nautical miles and operate in the Southwest Atlantic for months.

The article states that publicly available information alone cannot provide a vessel-by-vessel answer, but international evidence shows that subsidies have profoundly altered the economic logic of high seas fisheries, and that since 2025 legal instruments have existed to demand greater transparency and to challenge certain support measures. However, the agreement already reached still covers only part of the phenomenon.

An activity that cannot always function without assistance

The article cites a global study published in Science Advances in 2018 by researchers including Enric Sala. Based on satellite data, costs, catches and subsidy estimates, the study found that governments provide about US$4.2 billion a year to these operations. Without these transfers and with normal labor costs, up to 54% of the exploited areas would be economically unviable at the observed scale.

The study identified 3,620 high seas fishing vessels in 2016, with China, Taiwan, Japan, Indonesia, Spain and South Korea accounting for 77% of the vessels and 80% of detected fishing effort. The article notes that this does not mean all high seas vessels operate at a loss, nor that all assistance is illegal, but it shows that fish prices alone cannot explain many operations far from their home ports. For the Chinese, Taiwanese and Russian fleets, the calculated overall balance was unprofitable without subsidies; squid jigging is among the activities most dependent on subsidies.

Another estimate led by Rashid Sumaila and published in Marine Policy put global fisheries subsidies at US$35.4 billion in 2018. Of this, US$22.2 billion was classified as capacity-enhancing assistance, including fuel, vessel construction or modernization, infrastructure to expand activity, and certain access or fisheries development programs. Fuel was the largest category.

The latest data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), although covering 41 countries and economies, confirm that the phenomenon persists. The organization estimated average annual public support of US$10.7 billion between 2020 and 2022, equivalent to 10.6% of the value of landings. China accounted for 36.1% of recorded spending. The OECD considers that 65% of the support analyzed risks encouraging unsustainable fishing; among the 11 non-OECD economies assessed, this proportion reached 90%.

Not all subsidies have the same effect

The article points out that the term "subsidy" covers very different instruments. Transfers for purchasing fuel do not work the same way as funding for scientific surveys. Credit guarantees for vessel construction, tax exemptions, state insurance, or budgets for satellite monitoring and navigation safety create different incentives.

The core question is what cost each measure reduces and what behavior it encourages. Cheap fuel allows vessels to travel farther, stay at sea longer, or keep fishing when yields decline. Subsidized credit and shipbuilding increase capacity over decades. Tax exemptions, preferential insurance and state infrastructure—ports, cold storage, resupply and logistics—can also lower operating costs.

Conversely, scientific research, stock assessments, training, safety, monitoring and transition to lower-impact practices can improve management. Even assistance to fishers may be socially necessary if it sustains incomes during closed seasons without increasing fishing effort. The debate, therefore, is not about eliminating all state support, but about distinguishing which measures improve sustainability and which sustain capacity and fishing effort when resources or markets cannot support them.

What the WTO prohibits

The World Trade Organization's Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies entered into force on September 15, 2025. Argentina deposited its instrument of acceptance on July 22. Since then, binding multilateral rules have existed for members that have accepted the agreement.

The text prohibits subsidies to vessels or operators engaged in illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, provided that a positive determination is made by the coastal state, the flag state or the competent regional organization. The agreement also prohibits subsidies for fishing stocks that have been determined to be overfished, unless the assistance or related measures are aimed at rebuilding the stock.

The provision of greatest interest for the Southwest Atlantic is Article 5.1, which prohibits subsidies for fishing or related activities conducted outside a country's jurisdiction and outside the competence of a regional fisheries management organization or arrangement. The squid fishing adjacent to Argentina's exclusive economic zone takes place precisely in high seas areas where there is neither a bilateral agreement nor a regional organization with specific competence over the resource.

The rule lists transshipment, transport and the at-sea provision of fuel, personnel, gear and other supplies as related activities. However, to apply the prohibition, it must be demonstrated that a specific subsidy within the meaning of the WTO exists and that it benefits these operations. The mere existence of a state-promoted fleet or of tax-exempt fuel does not automatically complete this evidentiary burden.

The remaining gap is information

The agreement requires members to notify the types of fisheries activities that are subsidized and, to the extent possible, stock status, conservation measures, fleet capacity, beneficiary vessels and catches. At the first regular meeting of the Committee on Fisheries Subsidies on May 1, 2026, the WTO reported that only twelve members had initially submitted notifications concerning the regional organizations in which they participate. For a system based on transparency, the starting point is limited.

The article notes that this limitation is particularly evident in Argentina's case. Satellite systems and the work of the Naval Prefecture and the Navy can observe where vessels concentrate, how long they stay and when they interact with carrier vessels or tankers. But AIS signals do not show credit interest rates, tax rebates, real fuel prices, guarantees under public insurance, or programs financing shipbuilding. Linking fishing effort to state support requires cross-referencing commercial, fiscal, corporate and fisheries information, which is rarely public at the vessel level.